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ESSAY
Why is There Taylor v. Caldwell?
Three Propositions About
Impracticability
By ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM*
Professor, University of Connecticut
School of Law.
Introduction
THE ONTOLOGIST ASKS: 'Why is there something rather than
nothing?' We ask at contract law: 'Why is there Taylor v. Cald-
well' or Krell v. Henry?" Law and economics cannot answer the
question that Taylor presents at all. There is no sufficient reason
for the result in Taylor. A French judge could, if the facts were
clear, decide a question of law by drawing lots or casting a die.3 We
on the other hand, in cases like Taylor, disguise the law's arbitrari-
ness; it is still there, though. Oppositely, there is a sound economic
reason that supports the result in Krell.
In both Taylor and Krell, the parties failed to foresee and pro-
vide for an event that, said crudely, prevented completion of their
respective contracts. The cases have been allied under the topic of
* I would like to thank Lee Morrissey and Sharon Jones for their assistance in writing
and editing this article.
1. 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
2. [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.), aff'g in part 18 T.L.R. 823 (K.B. 1902).
I use single quotation marks to name pieces of language.
3. M. SCREECH, RABELAIS 268-72 (1979).
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impracticability, yet they differ in a decisive respect: in Taylor the
parties jointly suffered a loss; in Krell they did not.
The Krell kind of impracticability is just now coming to sepa-
rate itself out as distinct from the undecidable Taylor kind. Krell
is decidable. Because in Krell the parties suffered no loss, the court
served them best (most efficiently) by discharging the defendant,
but should have also ordered the return of the deposit. The im-
practicability of Krell is like that of the innovative, generally re-
jected Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., in which
the court adjusted a long term contract which had become onerous
for one party.4
The Taylor court too discharged the defendant. Yet, the crite-
rion by which one conventionally justifies Taylor and Krell today
is efficiency. A criterion of efficiency generally presupposes that al-
ternative ways to decide a case differently encourage or deter be-
havior. Inadvertent behavior, which both Taylor and Krell involve,
is by definition beyond adjudicative influence.
The classic article responding to the convention, written by
Posner and Rosenfield,' while always suggestive, now appears in-
creasingly incorrect. Or, to preserve its insights, we must make it
apply more narrowly than we first hoped. I have adopted their
broad use of 'impracticability' to include also impossibility and
frustration.' I agree with them that the separate terms do not
mark a functional distinction.
4. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) [hereinafter ALCOA].
5. Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
6. This Essay uses 'impracticability' as a general term covering also impossibility and
frustration. The American philosopher C.S. Peirce, distressed by others' misuse of 'pragma-
tism', replaced that term with 'pragmaticism'. He explained the latter "is ugly enough to be
safe from kidnappers." 5 C. PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE § 414,
at 216 (1934). A reader encountering in the legal literature 'impracticability' might think
that something similar is going on because it is ugly too. The term 'impracticable', however,
has a more honorable provenance than does 'impractical'. Dr. Johnson defined it partly by
'impossible', so even outside law and in the eighteenth century it had breadth. 1 S. JOHNSON,
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London 1755 & photo. reprint 1983) (un-
paginated). Moreover, Blackstone used it. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244. On the
other hand, the Oxford English Dictionary records the first use of 'impractical' as by J.S.
Mill in 1865. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 106 (1931). And at this word the Supple-
ment tells us: "Delete rare." 3 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
263 (1987).
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I. TAYLOR AND EFFICIENCY
A. Impracticability Rules
In this Essay, I will defend several propositions, the first being
that nothing about a rule's efficiency can explain Taylor v. Cald-
well. That explanatory deficit is immense and disquieting. Farns-
worth in Contracts labels the case "the fountainhead of the mod-
ern law of impossibility."' 7 Farnsworth is not Corbin: there were
giants in the earth in those days. He is, nevertheless, awfully au-
thoritative, and often gets the conventions right. A theory treating
Taylor as an exception is like a Toynbeean or Spenglerian theory
of history that makes the Roman Empire anomalous.
There are a few ground rules, which are only provisional be-
cause their presuppositions partly cause our troubles. The term
'explain' equivocates; stating a rule explains. The rule we seek will
decide every case of impracticability. Posner and Rosenfield state
"In every discharge case the basic problem is the same: to decide
who should bear the loss from an event that has rendered perform-
ance by one party uneconomical." 9
Impracticability rules, then, are functions whose arguments
are the facts of discharge cases, and whose values are performa-
tives,'" here only 'Discharge' and 'Do not discharge'. A judge ap-
plies a rule to the facts of a case and says the indicated judgment.
In the kind of case we are talking about, the parties have sustained
a loss which is joint in the first instance, and the judge's job is to
distribute it. This she does by discharging the promisor (promisee
loses) or not (promisor loses). The partition is all or nothing.
The program of law and economics is to select the efficient
(Pareto optimal) rule from the set of admissible rules. The pro-
gram cannot get off the ground if there are no efficient rules, or
more than one. That is, there must be one and only one efficient
rule. Otherwise, the criterion of efficiency cannot determine the
law. If no rule is efficient or if more than one are, the program
fails. I will use White's definition of 'efficiency': an efficient rule
7. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.5, at 673 (1982).
8. Somebody has counted 93 kinds of explanation. W. MATSON, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
62 (1965).
9. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 86.
10. A performative is a piece of language used to do something. 'I now pronounce you
man and wife', said with requisite authority, makes it so.
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"causes goods or services to be produced that have higher value
than those the parties would produce" otherwise.11
The but-for test articulates the type of cause relevant here.
Judge Easterbrook, an ally of efficiency, cautions: "To determine
whether a rule is beneficial," that is, efficient, "a court must ex-
amine how that rule influences future behavior."12 Clearly, if an
impracticability rule causes no behavior, we ought not call it 'effi-
cient'. Indeed, to consider it either efficient or inefficient is to make
a category mistake like insisting that the number three either is or
is not blue.
Posner and Rosenfield's sentence generalizes a remark in Tay-
lor. Taylor had hired Caldwell's hall to give concerts; then the hall
burned down. Taylor sued for his wasted promotional expenses.
His theory was that Caldwell had not performed because he had
not delivered the hall. Taylor of course lost. Blackburn, J. re-
marked: "[T]he question we have to decide is whether, under these
circumstances, the loss which the plaintiffs have sustained is to fall
upon the defendants. ' 13 Taylor's answer was 'No'.
B. Posner and Rosenfield
Posner and Rosenfield advocate an impracticability rule ('the
Orthodox Rule') that discharges a promisor if and only if the
promisee is the "cheaper insurer. '"14
Posner and Rosenfield argue thus: (1) 'An impracticability rule
is a default rule'.1 5 The premise is obviously true: the parties can
choose who bears a risk. (2) 'The sole efficient default rule allocates
risk as would the parties, if they had negotiated about the event'.
11. White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified
Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 355 (1988).
12. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 366
(7th Cir. 1987).
13. Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 833, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312 (Q.B. 1863).
14. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 91 (footnote omitted). The factors relevant to
determining which party to the contract is the cheaper insurer are (1) the risk-appraisal
costs and (2) transaction costs. The former comprise the costs of determining (a) the
probability that the risk will materialize and (b) the magnitude of the loss if it does materi-
alize. The amount of risk is the product of the probability of the loss and the magnitude of
the loss if it occurs.
Id.
15. A default rule is just a rule the parties may override: 'An acceptance is effective on
dispatch' states one but not 'Thou shalt not kill'.
[Vol. 23
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In the interesting case, the parties will expend resources writing
around a different default rule. (3) 'If the parties had negotiated
about the event, they would have assigned the risk of its occurring
to the cheaper insurer'. They would then save together the differ-
ence between their costs of insuring.
Imagine that the argument is sound (it is not). The parties
only save by not having to negotiate because the default rule sup-
plies the provision they want. The saving is small. It should not
cost much to negotiate an efficient clause if the parties have fo-
cused on what the clause would address sufficiently to decide not
to negotiate over it. Let discharging A save the world $.01. Still
that is a reason to discharge her. But it is a less compelling reason
than would be saving $1 million.
"In Taylor, the court put itself in place of the parties, which it
assumed were sensible business people, and attempted to deter-
mine how they would have allocated the risk had they foreseen
it.""6 Thus, Taylor helps Posner and Rosenfield here somewhat.
We must reflect on the relation between the contracting par-
ties and the supervening event alleged to cause impracticability.
The event (or condition) must occur or come to the attention of
the parties after they contract. The parties must have a particular
mental state relative to the event. Posner and Rosenfield charac-
terize the state by calling the event "unexpected' 7 and "unfore-
seen, or at least unprovided for."'"
16. Stroh, The Failure of the Doctrine of Impracticability, 5 CORP. L. REV. 195, 216-17
(1982). Cf. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain R.R., 832 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("Courts try to understand and interpret loose language in contracts ...
so that it means what the parties would have provided if they had thought about the prob-
lem expressly and spelled out their conclusions fully.").
17. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 88.
18. Id. at 90.
We will imagine one can coherently speak of foreseeing an event. The imprecision of the
law of impracticability comes partly from the incoherence of speaking this way. The impre-
cision itself is evidence that the law of impracticability functions badly.
A party must think of an event that has not happened yet under a description that
equally denotes uncountably many other possible events. Assume illustratively that events
are only different if they occur at different times. Let Caldwell foresee a fire at the hall June
11 at 3:00 PM plus r seconds. The probability of that particular event. occurring is zero. On
the other hand, if Caldwell simultaneously thinks of all fires occurring between 3:00 and
3:01, he thinks of uncountably many fires even if they are alike in all other respects.
Nontemporal characteristics of events work identically. A fire has an intensity, a spatial
location, and so forth. The empiricists had the same problems when thinking about
triangles.
Spring 19891
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Premise (3) presumes that Taylor and Caldwell save the dif-
ference between their costs of insuring. That presupposes one of
them insures. Of course if they fail to foresee the possibility of the
event that causes loss, and if one reads 'foresee' naturally,19 neither
insures. At least the parties do not buy insurance. Probably on this
ground, White restricts Posner and Rosenfield's analysis to "situa-
tions in which no outside insurer is involved."2 The reason to ex-
clude cases of buying insurance holds for actively self-insuring too.
Inadvertent self-insurance reduces to a relative preference for risk.
Posner and Rosenfield's analysis applies in that circumstance. It
discredits the analysis somewhat to show it applies to few cases.
'The Orthodox Rule is efficient' is the conclusion from prem-
ises (1) through (3). The argument fails because the Orthodox Rule
must cause the contracting parties not to negotiate. All of Posner
and Rosenfield's premises are true but there are not enough of
them. Besides (3), the argument requires a second counterfactual
premise, (4), 'If the rule were other than the Orthodox Rule, Tay-
lor and Caldwell would have negotiated'.
Now (4) is false-we have Corbin's word for it. "[W]e have
little ground for supposing," he said, "that the parties thought of
the possibility of fire."'21 Blackburn, J. said that in Taylor the
"parties when framing their agreement evidently had not present
Assuming one can think simultaneously of more than one event, did Caldwell think of
the actual fire if he thought under these descriptions: 'all possible fires (that destroy the
hall) June 11'; 'all possible events that would allow discharge'; 'all possible events of June
11'? At best Caldwell thought of the fire under the second description only if the court finds
impracticability, hence whatever judgment a court delivers makes the facts fit that decision.
So much for the metaphysics.
Thinking of the actual fire only under some descriptions amounts in law to thinking of
it simpliciter. Caldwell in legal contemplation did not foresee the fire if he thought briefly
about the course of the world until Armageddon.
The law lacks a principle for choosing among descriptions. This is not news. Schwartz,
for instance, sometimes a student of contract law, here writing on products liability, remarks
on "a well-known description problem" that he identifies as that "whether a risk is foresee-
able depends on how it is described, and the choice among possible descriptions is arbi-
trary." Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Sub-
stances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 693 (1985).
19. To foresee is either to expect or to contemplate. The former does not give the requi-
site unconsciousness to 'unforeseen'. The latter comes down to recognizing the possibility of
something. That is better but iterates modal operators if read back into the usual legal
'foresee the possibility': 'to recognize that it is possible that it is possible that . See 6 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1331 (rev. ed. 1962).
20. White, supra note 11, at 360.
21. 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 19, § 1331, at 356.
i ,., [Vol..2-3
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to their minds the possibility of such a disaster."22 It is not so
much that Blackburn, J. got the facts right as that his understand-
ing of them makes them what they are.
Taylor and Caldwell did not negotiate. The reason they did
not, however, is not their appreciation of the excellence of the im-
practicability rule. The parties simply did not perceive anything to
negotiate about. The result is independent of the particular im-
practicability rule. The Orthodox Rule does not cause the parties
to do anything; it fails the but-for test.
Kronman speaks helpfully from a context of unilateral mis-
take. 3 He says that information is instrumentally good because it
helps produce efficiency.2 He endorses a rule that he finds already
law although unrecognized. It forbids a contracting party to re-
scind for unilateral mistake.25 The rule therefore lets one party ex-
ploit the other by using information only the first has. Kronman
admires the rule because it encourages people to acquire informa-
tion.26 Kronman so far has been talking exclusively about deliber-
ately acquiring information. He also says: "The casual acquisition
of information, on the other hand, need not be protected, as a dis-
closure requirement for casually-acquired information would have
little or no effect on the production of socially useful informa-
tion. 1 7 A party cannot go around deliberately inadvertently ac-
quiring information. Neither can an impracticability rule induce
inadvertent behavior.28
22. Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 825, 833, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312 (Q.B. 1863).
23. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1978).
24. Id. at 4-5.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 9.
27. F. KESSLER, G. GILMORE & A. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS 92 (1986).
28. "For Wordsworth, in other words, the poet [who recollects emotion in tranquility] is
a man who attempts to write in obedience to the classic example of the double bind: 'be
spontaneous.' " B. Johnson, Strange Fits: Poe and Wordsworth on the Nature of Poetic
Language, in A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 89, 94 (1987).
On the level of polemic not scholarship Llewellyn helps marginally here.
I doubt whether in all of the quest for social science there has ever been such
hastily considered, ill-planned, mal-prepared, large-scale, so-called research as
was perpetrated by Cook and Oliphant at Hopkins. But it was at Yale that the
nadir or idiocy was achieved when Underhill Moore "tested out" whether law
has mystical operation by an elaborate observation, metering and statistiking
of the noneffect on the parking practices of New Haveners of a change in the
official traffic regulations which he had arranged to keep carefully from coming
Spring, 19891
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C. Efficient Breach
White says that Posner and Rosenfield "focus[] on cases in
which the promisor's decision whether or not to perform the con-
tract is not an important issue. "29 The basis of her claim is that
"the event that makes discharge a consideration in their examples
is beyond the control of the performing party."30 The expectancy
measure of damages efficiently prices breach. An impracticability
rule that qualifies that measure is pro tanto inefficient.
There is no question in Taylor of the choice of an impractica-
bility rule affecting Caldwell's decision to perform. Caldwell had
promised to deliver a hall but there was no hall to deliver. Caldwell
breaches no matter what. Like the constraint on foreseeing, that on
the choice to perform forecloses the impracticability rule from af-
fecting behavior.
D. Optimal Foreseeing
The law often drifts from requiring that an event be unfore-
seen to requiring that it be unforeseeable. Two purposes might im-
pel this drift, one interesting to us."1 The uninteresting purpose is:
to replace a subjective with an objective test, so that a case does
not turn on a mentalistic, hence not publicly observable, fact. That
just economizes adjudicatory resources: it is more expensive,
through discovery and so forth, to prove what was foreseen than it
is to prove what was foreseeable.
The interesting purpose, although likely it is not very con-
scious, is to build a norm into what began as a description. Syntac-
tically, the law derives 'foreseeable' from 'foreseen' by adding a
modal operator. If objectivity alone were at stake, that operator
would be alethic, giving 'able to be foreseen' or 'possibly foreseen'.
But to call an event 'foreseeable' is uninformative without specifi-
cation of a threshold because in a sense, albeit the wrong sense,
to the knowledge of any trafficker.
Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 399, 400-01 (1955).
29. White, supra note 11, at 360.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, 775 F.2d 781,786 (7th Cir. 1985)
("The applicability of the defense of commercial impracticability, then, turns largely on
foreseeability. The relevant inquiry is whether the risk of the occurrence of the contingency
was so unusual or unforeseen. ... ) (emphasis added).
' [Vol. 23
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any event is foreseeable. Plausibly, an event foreseeable in legal
contemplation is one likely to be foreseen with reasonable effort.
The 'reasonable' is like that in 'reasonable person', hence the req-
uisite foresight is the efficient amount. The operator then is deon-
tic: 'ought to be foreseen'.
The rule 'Shoot a contracting party who does not foresee a
supervening event' elicits more investment in foreseeing than the
Orthodox Rule elicits. But Posner and Rosenfield do not admit
that rule, because its judgment is irregular: they allow a judge to
say 'Discharge', but not 'Death by slicing'. The admissible rules
have in common that they assign the loss already there. The inad-
missible ones augment or diminish that loss.
All the inadmissible rules are inefficient. The goal is to get the
optimal quantity of foreseeing. On balance, apparently, there are
no externalities from foresight. Any loss from failure to foresee
falls on the contracting parties who do the failing. Then having the
parties bear exactly the cost of their lack of foresight optimizes
socially. They will invest in foreseeing until its marginal expected
gain to them falls to its marginal cost to them. Without external
economies or diseconomies, they maximize the social product
there.32
All admissible impracticability rules-those that do not
change the loss to the parties-ought to elicit the same level of
investment. At least nobody has argued they do not. The encour-
agement to foresee is the loss from not foreseeing. So long as that
is held constant, the null hypothesis is that its distribution does
not affect the level of investment. If Taylor will sustain the loss, he
will expend the effort to foresee; oppositely if Caldwell will sustain
it. If the loss is divided,3 a diminution in foreseeing by one party
32. For a discussion of search, which is really what is going on here, see Craswell,
Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401
(1988).
To describe a risk as remote is not to say that a firm had no idea at all that its
product could cause great harm. A risk is remote when a firm either (i) was
ignorant or (ii) believed great harm unlikely, and research to correct either
impression was not cost justified.
Schwartz, supra note 23, at 718.
33. The expected loss can be divided even if, as we have been assuming, the judicial
choice is only between 'Discharge' and 'Do not discharge'. A party can have any probability
of sustaining a loss, depending on the impracticability rule. A 0.5 probability of sustaining it
is (if a party is risk neutral) equal to a certainty of sustaining half of it.
Spring 19891
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offsets an increase in that by the other.
Posner and Rosenfield say: "[I]f one party is a superior risk
bearer, the entire loss should be placed on him in order to en-
courage future parties similarly situated to insure or take other
measures to minimize the economic consequences of nonperform-
ance." '' The cheaper insurer might also be the cheaper foreseer.
But that must be argued for; so far, nothing correlates good insur-
ing with good foreseeing. If there is a difference between the par-
ties in foreseeing skills, a rule better than the Orthodox Rule is
'Discharge a contracting party unless she is the cheaper foreseer'.
In summary, impracticability rules do not affect parties' be-
havior after contracting, and do not affect it at contracting, other
than to divide a constant quantity of foreseeing between the par-
ties. Therefore, a criterion of efficiency gets no purchase. That
much is clear without taking account of rules that change the par-
ties' loss. Relative to them, the rules that do not change the loss all
optimally encourage foreseeing. Still a judge has no basis in effi-
ciency on which to choose among these rules.
II. TAYLOR AS UNDECIDABLE
The second proposition I will defend is that just as efficiency
cannot decide Taylor and like cases, neither can any other
criterion.
A. Data
A reader of the literature on impracticability is astonished
that at this late date, 125 years after Taylor, it is so tentative and
unsuccessful. There is of course nothing tentative about Posner
and Rosenfield. But aspects of their article that are critical of
traditional (noneconomic) investigation are especially convincing.
The authors disparage theories of impracticability antecedent to
their own (1977). They say either a theory advocates "a broad and
undefined judicial discretion, the result of amorphous, ad hoc con-
cepts such as fairness, equity, and justice," or it is "complex, arbi-
trary, at times almost incomprehensible" yet not "systematic.""
That critique, by authors intolerant of techniques besides
34. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 114.
35. Id. at 87.
[Vol. 23
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their own, might be unrealistically negative. Still, more sympa-
thetic scholars do not assess differently. Halpern describes, with
some poetic license, a student of impracticability, A, having to
"live with" B, who is "unsatisfying," although A "yearn[s] for" C."8
His is one of the most erotic passages in contract law. In its conceit
of unrequited love, B is "doctrinal compromises" at impracticabil-
ity, C an elusive "comprehensive and consistent doctrinal solu-
tion. ' 37 That comes from the final paragraph of a careful article.
Halpern is recapitulating the law. Yet he writes like Yeats contem-
plating Maude Gonne.
Let us concede that the law of impracticability is not as it
should be and try to explain the trouble. I do not think that any-
thing contingent is going on here. If it were, scholars of impractica-
bility, who are likely to be no less able than other contracts schol-
ars, have had an extraordinary run of bad luck. Something makes
necessary our collective failure to construct a satisfactory rule.
B. Rationale
Pretend for a moment that an unspecified criterion, call it 'X',
is the only true one-X might be efficiency, might be something
else. X can fail to guide a judge two ways. The facts of the case
might have no significance for X. That is how Part I made Taylor
undecidable. There, X being efficiency, it could, Judge Easterbrook
admonishes, only evaluate behavioral consequences, and there were
none. Caldwell could not perform; the parties did not foresee the
fire.
Or the facts of a case significant for X can offset each other. If
there are no discontinuities, a kind of fixed point theorem assures
that this even balance for X occurs at some case. If X is, for in-
stance, virtue, circumstances can vary imperceptibly from litigant
A being virtuous and litigant B lascivious 8 to the converse. At
some case then A and B are at the same place on the virtue-lascivi-
ousness scale.
We may generalize from a single criterion X to multiple crite-
36. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching
for "the Wisdom of Solomon", 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1178 (1987).
37. Id.
38. The opposition is from Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma-
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1373 (1988).
Spring. 1989]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
ria, XO, X1,. . ., Xn, applied successively or in weighted combina-
tion. Still there will be a case we cannot decide. The only change is
that we assess cases in n-dimensional space, n>1.
We just call that undecidable case a 'case of impracticability'.
It is a hypothetical case, undecidability's Platonic form, imper-
fectly realized in the actual world. I think that is what is going on.
We categorize as about impracticability those cases our regular
rules cannot decide. Then 'impracticability rule' means a function
having arguments only at that point in our space that is ruleless.
We get multiple arguments for the function, different cases of im-
practicability, by adding functionally irrelevant dimensions to our
space. If a case is undecidable, and lasciviousness not a criterion,
changing a party's lasciviousness will give a factually different case,
not less undecidable. If 'rule' imports something besides chaos,
'impracticability rule' becomes an oxymoron.
C. Will and Fault
Taylor is a fine actualization of this undecidable case, X being
efficiency. Also, we can see roughly already that its facts do not
allow us to decide it by other criteria. The situation, crudely, is
that Taylor and Caldwell, having sustained a joint loss, have no
salient characteristics that let us designate either to bear it other
than arbitrarily. We require more description to decide Taylor in a
principled way. That implies there are other criteria. We should
entertain the possibility that efficiency is the only criterion. De-
scriptions of ostensibly separate criteria may be the admonition 'be
efficient' more restrictively stated for narrow circumstances. For
example, the rule that gives expectancy damages instructs 'be effi-
cient' by circumlocution.
We could make two kinds of changes. We could add a clause
to the contract: 'Taylor (Caldwell) is to bear the lost promotional
expenses in case of fire'. Or we could have Taylor or Caldwell in-
tentionally or negligently set the fire. Immediately we can decide
Taylor. Our criteria are that the parties can make the contract
they choose (will) and that anyone who causes a loss bears it
(fault). We may reduce either criterion to efficiency. 9
Now we have a choice: we may speak of Taylor thus changed
39. On will, consult Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 98; fault is routinely assessed
by the Hand formula, itself an efficient rule.
[Vol. 23
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as a case of impracticability although an easy one, or of it as now
not a case of impracticability at all. The latter conceptualization is
better. We must speak thus starting somewhere or proceed imper-
ceptibly until Marbury v. Madison ° becomes a very easy case of
impracticability because its litigants did not contract. Taylor
changed, then, is a case about the wills of the parties or about
fault. Also if the contract does assign the risk, the contracting par-
ties foresaw the event.
A curiosity of Farnsworth's great Contracts is instructive here.
The book teaches: "The party who claims that a supervening event
frustrated his performance must meet four requirements."' 41 Then:
"First the event must have 'substantially frustrated' his 'principal
purpose' . 42 What is left? At least: "Third, the frustration
must have resulted without the fault of the party seeking to be
excused" and "Fourth, that party must not have assumed a greater
obligation than the law imposes."' 3 It is a bad mistake unusual for
so careful a scholar to define a word using itself. The seeming re-
dundancy of Farnsworth's requirements three and four points up
they are out of place in impracticability.
D. Other Criteria
We think: maybe a single, efficient impracticability rule is
maximally fair. We sometimes prefer fairness, that is, put a
nonzero price on it." Courts supply it. Fairness is less decidable
than efficiency. Judge Easterbrook starts his analysis of a case:
"We may dispose summarily of the argument from 'common sense
and elemental justice.' "4' His point is that justice or fairness is
supervenient on the more tangible facts of a case. In Taylor un-
changed, without a clause in the contract that assigns risk and
without fault, we cannot distinguish the parties by the fairness of
putting the loss on one of them. There must be something, fault or
whatever, that makes putting the loss there fair.
It is arguably maximally fair to divide the loss. Generally, do-
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.7, at 690.
42. Id. at 691 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981)).
43. Id.
44. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, in RA-
TIONAL CHOICE 101 (R. Hogarth & M. Reder eds. 1987).
45. In re Iowa R.R., 840 F.2d 535, 536 (7th Cir. 1988).
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ing that requires that Posner and Rosenfield's function have values
beyond 'Discharge' and 'Do not discharge'. Dawson, disapprov-
ingly, acknowledged the possibility of and cited authority for di-
viding the loss: "[S]ome have strongly urged, that reliance losses
should be split-presumably divided by two or by whatever num-
ber of parties there may be."' 6
Dawson, however, continued: "This solution seems to me no
more rational than appointing some neutral person to toss a
coin.' 7 For 'rational' read 'fair'. That is an insightful remark. We
best interpret Dawson to say that to be unfair in a context where
there is no good reason to assign the loss to either party is to as-
sign it for a bad reason. We want to assign it for no reason at all.
The intuition that supports dividing the loss only excludes bias.
But we exclude bias by resorting to a random process. There is
nothing to choose between distributions reached randomly. Or a
preference for dividing the loss is at best a weak basis to decide
cases like Taylor.
If all else fails, we think, we could adhere to precedent-just
follow Taylor. But we have not done that. Following precedent is
conventional behavior. To get a system of precedent off the
ground, its participants must share or largely share a similarity re-
lation between cases. Any case is a precedent for any other using
some relation. Without a similarity relation a court is a tower of
Babel. But 'Decide this case like Taylor' does not tell a court or
the parties how to go on.48
III. KRELL AND EFFICIENCY
The third proposition I will defend is that there is a class of
cases including Krell v. Henry, subsumed under impracticability,
yet unlike Taylor decidable.
46. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts, 1982 JURID. REV. 86, 90 n.11
(citing Dobbs, REMEDIES pp. 268-69; comments in 69 YALE L.J. 1054 (1960) and 18 CHI. L.
REV. 153 (1950)). To a Harvard professor, Yale and Chicago comments, the one experimen-
tal, the other dogmatic, are unlikely authoriatative.
47. Id.
48. See generally S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982);
Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in EXPERIENCE & THEORY 19 (L. Foster & J.
Swanson eds. 1970).
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A. Lack of Loss in Krell
Krell had for June 26 and 27 let Henry a flat from which to
view processions connected to crowning Edward VII. The king be-
came ill with appendicitis and the processions were postponed. So
Queen Alexandra knew where he was for a while."" Krell sued
Henry for the unpaid balance of the rent on the rooms: £50.52."0
Williams, J. decided Edward's illness had frustrated the contract.
In a recent article,51 Wladis discovers that postponing the
processions "completely changed the complexion of the" case from
what it would have been had they been cancelled.2 What changed
was that a "difficult loss allocation question had become simple. ' 53
Actually it just went away because there was no loss to allocate.
Wladis reasons as follows. The postponement did not injure Krell.
June 26 and 27 were days of great value for Krell's flat. The post-
ponement just replaced them by August 3 and October 11, the
days for which the procession was rescheduled. Nor did the post-
ponement hurt Henry. He could rent a flat again, perhaps even
Krell's, on August 9 and October 11. This absence of loss is an
economic fact on which the law operates.
I think Wladis is right that Krell and Henry lost nothing. But
next he makes a wrong inference: "The Krell case can be deleted
.or reduced to the status of a footnote case. '5' Not Krell. The ca-
non has to count for something. Farnsworth in Contracts calls
Krel "the fountainhead of the doctrine of frustration. '55 A foun-
tainhead is not a puddle. So Wladis is speaking controversially. He
adds: "If [Krell] is retained, it ought to be taught not as a case of
general application but as a case reaching an equitable result on
the unique set of circumstances surrounding Edward VII's post-
poned coronation. '56 Wladis is wrong because Krell-like cases are
49. "In a sense it was Queen Alexandra that spoke Edward VII's epitaph. 'Now at
least,' she told Lord Esher, 'I know where he is.'" Other Comments, FORBES, July 11, 1988,
at 24 (quoting R. COLLIER, RAINBOW PEOPLE).
50. Henry dropped his claim to his deposit of £25. I pretend that the entire rent was
the £50.
51. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine
of Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEo. L.J. 1575 (1987).
52. Id. at 1619.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1630.
55. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.7, at 689 (Farnsworth freely finds fountainheads).
56. Wladis, supra note 51, at 1631.
Spring 1989]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
as plentiful as blackberries.
B. Creating Risk in Gaon
A second Krell-like case is Albert G. Gaon & Co. v. Soci&t6
Interprofessionelle des Oleagineux Fluides Alimentaires,57 a Suez
Canal case. I assume the parties did not foresee that the Canal
might close. The loss here is not zero but below the apparent loss.
Gaon, by two contracts, agreed to sell 2500 tons of Sudanese
groundnuts (peanuts) to Soci(t6. The contracts were c.i.f. Nice and
Marseilles. So Gaon had to get them there. The contemplated
route, Canal or not, was east to the Red Sea. Hence the ground-
nuts would have reached saltwater only slightly south of the Canal
and their destination was near its other end. Closing the Canal
lengthened the distance almost as much as it could: from 2300 to
10,500 miles.
Gaon defaulted and Soci6t6 sued in London for the differences
between the contract prices and the market price at Nice and Mar-
seilles. It recovered these differences. The opinion by Lord Justice
Seller in the Court of Appeal is a fair sample of all the opinions in
Gaon.
[T]he changed circumstances gave rise to a change in the per-
formance of the contracts by the sellers, but it is not so funda-
mental a change that it can be said to be commercially differ-
ent or of such a character that the parties at the time of the
making of the contract, if they had considered the position,
would have said with one voice that in those circumstances
their bargain would be at an end."
If Gaon had the purity of Krell it would go like this. Closing
the Canal caused an increase X in the cost of transportation. Gaon
must incur it. Closing the Canal also caused the same increase X in
the price of groundnuts at Nice and Marseilles. Soci~t6 could real-
ize it.59 In the pure form of Gaon, closing the Canal causes no loss
to Gaon and Soci6t6 jointly. They just collect X from Societe's
buyer and remit X to Gaon's carrier. It does not matter that So-
ci~t6 may have sold the groundnuts before the Canal closed. Say it
57. [1960] 2 Q.B. 318 (C.A.).
58. Id. at 362.
59. The change in cost would equal the change in price if the Sudan were the only
supplier of groundnuts, and if the demand for groundnuts were perfectly inelastic.
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sold them to A. The analysis proceeds identically with 'A' substi-
tuted for 'Socit6'. The parties have shifted the increase in the cost
of transporting the groundnuts forward. The analysis succeeds un-
less Socit6 (or A) is the end user of the groundnuts. In that case
there is not a nonparty further along the chain to shift the loss to.
The actual numbers in Gaon were these. The contract prices
were £49 10s. and £54 per ton; the market price was £62 5s. There-
fore Socit6 recovered £12 15s. and £8 5s. The contract price prob-
ably reflected the market price when the parties contracted. Clos-
ing the Canal increased the cost/ton of transporting the
groundnuts from approximately £6 to between £27 9s. and £29 5s.
Hence the parties passed on about half their joint loss.
Assume the pure case again. The Court of Appeal in Gaon did
contracting parties similarly situated a disservice by creating a
risk. Compare three possible worlds: (1) the Canal stays open and
the parties perform the contract as they anticipated; (2) the Canal
closes and the court decides against Gaon; (3) the Canal closes and
the court discharges Gaon. (3) is equivalent to (1) in terms of the
parties' expectations. (2) is equivalent to (1) and (3) plus the
risk-contingent on the Canal closing-that Socit will gain and
Gaon will lose about £22 per ton. Had it not discharged Henry, the
court in Krell would have created an equivalent risk that Henry
would lose and Krell gain £50.
Think of a risk as a kind of negative cow. The world comes
with both cows and risks. "The air is not so full of flies in summer
as it is at all times of invisible devils."60 For 'devils' read 'risks' in
the modern way. A cow is on balance a good thing so that if a court
could inexpensively create a cow it should. A risk is a less concrete
bad thing. But a court can create a risk. In Gaon, it is as though
the court said: 'You have the contract you wrote plus a bet on the
closing of the Canal'. If the parties in Gaon or Krell had wanted to
wager on the Canal closing or the king getting sick they could have
done that separately. Even then it might have been illegal. The
closing of the Canal being unforeseen, the court could have given
the parties the contract they wrote by discharging Gaon. The sim-
plest rule efficient for these cases is 'Discharge a promisor if and
only if there is no (or disproportionately little) loss'.
60. A. HUXLEY, THE DEVILS OF LOUDUN 171 (1965) (quoting R. Burton).
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C. The Remedy in ALCOA
Most students of ALCOA reject the case. Dawson was a
profound scholar who often stayed calm at doctrinal calamities. In
the course of a single article, however, he called ALCOA "gro-
tesque," "bizarre," "a lonely monument on a bleak landscape," and
"the frustrated venture of a single trial judge whose fancy was un-
usually free."'6' Certainly courts have declined to invoke ALCOA. 62
Halpern excels at tropes as we have seen. 3 Discomfited, he dis-
plays two at ALCOA to convey its disuse: the "judicial sands have
shifted more to cover over ALCOA than to expand on it"; ALCOA
"has virtually faded into obscurity."'64
The facts of ALCOA are these. In 1967, the parties entered
into a contract that Essex could extend through 1988. ALCOA
promised to process Essex's alumina into molten aluminum. Essex
promised to pay ALCOA a price determined partly by the Whole-
sale Price Index - Industrial Commodities. ALCOA set a profit of
about $.04 per pound and foresaw that varying by up to $.03. The
parties did not set the price at ALCOA's costs plus a profit because
then ALCOA must reveal its costs and would have no incentive to
produce cheaply.
In the 1970's, because of the oil crisis, the price of electricity,
which smelting aluminum consumes in large quantities, rose much
faster than the Index. The price of energy in general rose. And
more directly, oil is used to generate electricity. Hence there was
"a 500% variation of costs to Index," which of course ALCOA did
not foresee.65 Also: "[T]he court specifically finds that when the
contract was made, even people of exceptional prudence and fore-
sight would not have anticipated a need for this additional limita-
tion ... ."6 The economist Alan Greenspan, whom ALCOA con-
sulted and who did not foresee the failure of the Index, functions
here as an ideal observer. Essex's cost of aluminum was $.3635 in
61. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U.L.
REV. 1, 26, 28, 35 (1984).
62. See, e.g., Groseth Int'l v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 166 (1987) ("We cannot
accept the logic in ALCOA .... ).
63. See supra text accompanying note 36.
64. Halpern, supra note 36, at 1127.
65. ALCOA, 499 F. Supp. 53, 65 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
66. Id. at 64 n.5.
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1979; at that time the resale price of aluminum was $.73313.67 AL-
COA was losing the difference.
In ALCOA, as in Krell and the pure Gaon, there was no loss to
the parties jointly. ALCOA just made transfer payments to Essex.
Judge Teitelbaum saw this. His language is exactly right. He said,
"A significant fraction of Essex's advantage is directly attributable
to the corresponding out of pocket losses ALCOA suffers"; 8
"[O]ver the entire life of the contract it will lose, out of pocket, in
excess of $60 million, and the whole of this loss will be matched by
an equal windfall profit to Essex;" 9 and finally "The equivalence
of ALCOA's loss and Essex's gain may distinguish this case from
the concededly more difficult 'Suez cases.'" 70
The court reformed the contract to allow ALCOA the least
profit it foresaw. But Alcoa and Essex settled before the remedy
was put into effect. The rule White7 1 prefers in Gaon is that a
court measure damages to the promissee by the net loss caused by
the event plus default. That protects a promisee without creating a
risk. Judge Teitelbaum, in ALCOA, in effect followed White's rule.
ALCOA being a pure form of Gaon, even purer than Krell, there
were no damages.
Conclusion
The two most significant cases of impracticability must be
Taylor and Krell. They are Farnsworth's fountainheads and part
of our heritage in contract law. They shape our thought as does
King Lear. Yet functionally they are not related. Taylor is un-
decidable because a court might distribute their joint loss equally
well to Taylor or Caldwell. Oppositely, because the parties sus-
tained no loss, Krel is decidable by discharging Henry.
I have argued that no impracticability rule succeeds for two
taxonomic reasons. First, necessarily there is not a rule to decide
cases like Taylor. These are cases of impracticability because they
are undecidable; the category of impracticability is a repository of
them. Second, as things stand, an impracticability rule must ad-
67. Id. at 59.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 66.
70. Id. at 66 n.8. Judge Teitelbaum did not cite Gaon.
71. White, supra note 11, at 370-73.
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dress both Taylor and Krell, which are functionally unrelated.
Then stating an impracticability rule is like making a claim that is
simultaneously true and interesting about the class of prime num-
bers and Kirk's dik-diks. The predicates that commend them-
selves, for instance, 'furry, if not abstract' or 'all but one odd, if not
ruminative', are awkward. Others, like 'existent', are uselessly
vague.
